Ladies and Gentlemen, shit has hit the fan.

I wish I didn’t have to start my day with this exact sentence. No, I don’t talk to myself in English, nor do I like to address my friends as if they are my audience. It was just a pleasant weekend getaway with a bunch of friends in the Adirondacks before I checked twitter, only to learn about the Israeli naval forces’ attack to stop the flotilla sponsored by the international Free Gaza Movement from reaching Gaza. The flotilla, comprised of six ships and some 600 passengers and crew, was carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza, which is under siege, and, evidently, still under Israeli occupation. I chose to use the shit-fan analogy, but feel free to insert your favorite analogy here: Pandora’s box, can of worms, you name it.

Bottom line: May 31st marks the day when the international tide turns against Israel. The consequences will be grave not only for the region and the peace process but also for the international reputation that Israel has wasted generously over the last several years. It is also a critical point in time for Hamas and Palestine. Hamas has managed the crisis smoothly until now, and for the time being it should stay out of the mess and let the main actors solve it out among each other.

As for Turkey, May 31st marks the day when the bilateral relations between the two countries hit an all-time low, possibly leading them to the brink of war. And if political scientists are right in their predictions, we are not too far away from a Turkish diversionary war against Israel.

It was only last week when Israel officially announced that it might have to resort to limited violence should the flotilla enter Gazan territorial waters. Instead, Israel offered to take over the aid packages and distribute them to the people itself. This is quite understandable as the Israeli government is distrustful of this international effort, especially due to the key role of the controversial Turkish NGO—IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation—has been playing throughout the organization and the execution of the campaign. According to a 2006 report, the IHH has been accused of providing material support to militant Islamic groups such as Al Qaeda, which is a good enough reason to scare the life out of Israel. Of course, it goes without saying that the Israeli distrust is only exacerbated by the emotional as well as material involvement of the Turkish delegation in the campaign given the infamous remarks of Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos and the more recent ambassador crisis that escalated the tension between the two countries.

Did I expect the IDF to move beyond verbal scare tactics and stage a military response against the FGM flotilla, in international waters? No, because, well, it’s the international waters where Israel can have no legitimate use of force toward national security. Furthermore, all those arguments including imminent threat/preventive attack/preemptive strike/self-defense (political scientese-to-english translation: first strike (can be legitimated) in order to defend yourself in the face of a security threat) don’t hold since the 600 people on the ship were civilians, i.e. people who are not enrolled in the army or police forces. I’m sure you’ve heard of crimes against humanity and/or war crimes. Killing civilians? Yes, that does count toward a humanitarian crime, and as much as many in the region want to promote Israel as the mother of all evil, it is disgraceful for all countries, including the most "evil" ones, to be accused of committing such crimes.

Am I surprised by the attack? Again, no. In a firm believer of second-image explanations of International Relations, I think it is impossible to abstract Israel’s international deeds from its domestic politics. In fact, this incident looks like a textbook example of coalition politics and their policy consequences. The right-wing coalition in Israel under Benjamin Netanyahu, who himself has become extreme enough even for a median Likud voter, seems to be pulled time and again by Avigdor Lieberman, the chair of the ultra right-wing Yisrael Beitenu (second largest coalition party following Likud), who is also currently serving as the minister of foreign affairs. Netanyahu has been stuck between a rock and a hard place twice since he came to power in March 2009, the most recent of which was the settlement crisis that erupted between Israel and its most staunch international ally, the United States a few months ago. Although it is observed less in the settlement crisis than in the ambassador crisis with Turkey, Netanyahu seems to be extremetized (there’s no such word, but it does serve its purpose) by the policy preferences of YB, and I suspect that an insider-reading of the flotilla incident will reveal that Lieberman and his YB was once again pivotal in the decision to launch the naval operation. I’m not surprised because a) states are not rational and b) it takes a party (and sometimes just an individual) to hijack the policy process and push their country off the cliff.

What will happen to the peace process now? Probably for the first time the tide has turned against Israel. Basically the country fell hostage to its own domestic politics and ended up shooting itself in the foot. Nothing will change that, even if the US and the UK still prefers to keep a neutral position by arguing that they still need to see the results of the investigations.

Does this mean that the tide has turned in favor of Gaza and the Palestinian cause at large? Not necessarily. Right now it all depends on how Hamas will decide to handle the situation. So far so good, though. Hamas has chosen not to engage with the FGM flotilla other than saying that they appreciated the international humanitarian effort. This is a smart and indeed the right move, which leaves those against Hamas without a legitimate reason to accuse Hamas of escalating the tension between Israel and the international community, and Turkey more specifically, and damage the peace process. The word is already on the street that a third intifada is imminent. The consequences of the next intifada can be catastrophic, especially given the present composition of the Israeli government. The best strategy for Hamas is to stay out of the flotilla crisis and let Israel muddle in its own mess. Silence is golden now more than ever.

How about Turkey? Turkish government seems to have found the secret path to win the heart and mind of the average Turkish voter: do the Gaza talk and BAM! You are as good as new, as legitimate and popular as you were back in 2002. The trick definitely worked for Erdogan in January 2009 when he trademarked the phrase “One minute” as he gave the attitude to the WP columnist David Ignatius. He was losing steam in the run up to the April 2009 local elections but he managed to spur his party’s performance via his individual act on the international scene.

The flotilla incident may, and indeed does, serve for the very same purpose for Turkey’s AKP, which has been going through an incredibly tough time over the last few months. The crisis that erupted between the government and the tobacco workers in the fall of last year over social security benefits, followed by the increasing intolerance of the government toward dissenting views and opinions about its economic and political performance and most recently the remarks of Erdogan in response to the deadly methane explosion in Zonguldak led to an exponential decrease of public support for the government, not to mention the ever-murkier waters of the Ergenekon trials, the occasional—and yet deadly—attacks of the PKK to the military outposts in the southeast and the recent change of leadership in the country’s main opposition party (Republican People’s Party, or CHP) to a very popular (albeit not charismatic) bureaucrat-turned-politician Kemal Kilicdaroglu.

Could the flotilla incident be the Kardak of the AKP government? Yes it could. The dispute that was caused by what literally was a piece of rock on the Aegean that brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war certainly helped the centre-right coalition in 1996 divert public attention away from the domestic economic and political problems of the time. The coalition was probably ready to take Turkey to war against Greece, which would have been the classic example of what we call “diversionary warfare” in the field. The idea behind diversionary warfare is that governments choose to divert attention away from the domestic problems that cause a decrease in governmental popularity and legitimacy by waging wars, which they hope would rally the nation around the flag, and in turn boost up public opinion ratings for the government.

The flotilla could well serve the same purpose, and indeed it already does. Although for a sizeable group of Turks the IHH involvement and the way in which the flotilla responded to the Israeli warnings—insisting to approach Gaza in spite of the statements of Israel, as well as having a baby on board whose mere presence is enough to raise question marks—causes cynicism, it is not at all surprising that even the most cynical among us have reacted emotionally to the Israeli operation and praised the strong diplomacy that the government has immediately put forward at the international scene by calling for an emergency Security Council meeting. The more emotional among us have already started chanting for war, which is smartly addressed by the government’s old hawk Bulent Arinc, a conservative veteran of Turkish politics, who stated that Turkey will not wage war against Israel. One should raise an eyebrow, however, at the way in which Arinc’s remarks coincided with those of Necati Ozgen, a retired military general, who insisted that Turkey should take the attack as casus belli. The government could very well take advantage of the “expert opinion” of the military, rhetorically and/or actually, by pointing how it is legitimate for the country to fight Israel. This alone is enough to divert public attention away from the Zonguldak deaths, the rising public support for the secular opposition party, as well as the most recent (as yet anonymous) attack that killed seven soldiers in Hatay, a city in southern Turkey, literally a few hours before the Israeli attack in the Mediterranean. Indeed, some have already speculated that Israel might be involved in the attack on the Hatay naval command, which would kill two birds with one stone: it would a) give yet another reason for a Turkish attack against Israel and b) divert attention away from the incapacitated state from defending such important military posts from attacks, especially those that involve the Kurdish Workers Party, the PKK (which may or may not take responsibility for the attacks.)

Of course, it is not so easy for Turkey to declare war against Israel, which is its closest and most strategic ally in the region, especially in the military area. Not even the strongest, most conservative governments in Turkey were able to burn the bridges with Israel (think of the anti-Zionist Necmettin Erbakan in the 1990s), but that does not mean that this is impossible. Turkey and Israel have been increasingly antagonizing each other for more than two years now, and as history has shown us time and again, it only takes a few erratic politicians to take their countries to the political Mustafar. The Obi-Wans of the international community, i.e. the UN or NATO, could only help them so much in their fights against themselves, but the consequences may hurt more than just the Anakins of the international community.

I just hope that it won’t be the people of Palestine that suffer from the fight of these elephants in the end.

Copyright 2010 © Sibel Oktay